In episode 330 of the InsuranceAUM.com podcast hosted by Stewart Foley, Adams Street’s Jeffrey Diehl, Managing Partner & Head of Investments discusses how many large, publicly traded private credit managers have rapidly scaled the assets under management attributable to their business development companies and life insurance general accounts over the past decade. This can increase pressure on investment teams to deploy capital, which has the potential to compromise underwriting standards and credit selection, leading to sub-par returns, an underappreciated risk for institutional investors.
Transcript
Stewart: Hey, welcome back. It’s great to have you. We’ve got a great podcast for you today. My name’s Stewart Foley, and this is the InsuranceAUM.com podcast. Before we get going too far, I want to do a little housekeeping. We have a private credit ABF event coming up in Texas. It is November 5th and 6th in beautiful Austin, at the Thompson Hotel. It is open to insurance investment allocators who are focused in private credit, ABF, and private assets. You can find the registration link on our website, on the hamburger menu in the upper left, just click on events, and it’s the first one listed. I think the official title is the Insurer’s Private Credit Forum and certainly looking forward to seeing you there. So that is very topical because the title of today’s podcast is our Private Credit Hyperscalers: A Ticking Time Bomb, and we’re joined today by Jeffrey Diehl, Managing Partner, Head of Investments at Adams Street Partners. Jeff, welcome to the show. Thanks for taking the time to join us today.
Jeffrey: Thanks, Stewart, and I really appreciate what you’re doing for your audience. I listen to many of your episodes and they’ve just been terrific. So thanks for having me.
Stewart: I appreciate it, man. People ask me sometimes they go, how do I know that these are insurance people and investments people listening to these podcasts and I’m like, try to get your significant other to listen to one. You and I were just talking about having daughters, and it’s interesting because you and I live really close to each other here in Texas, which is fun. So I said the other day, I’m the flag bearer for the “I think insurance asset management is cool” parade, and it’s not a huge parade, but the people who are participating definitely think insurance asset management is cool as well.
Jeffrey: That’s great.
Stewart: Yeah. So you oversee the overall management of the firm. You guide the investment team’s processes and strategies. You joined back in 2001, and I’d like to know just a little bit about you. So could you tell us where you grew up and just how you got into the seat where you are today?
Jeffrey: I appreciate it. Yeah. I grew up in a small town in Wisconsin, actually just north of Madison, about 45 minutes away, called Wisconsin Dells. It’s a bit of a waterpark, capital of the world, tourist destination for folks in the Midwest. And I grew up actually working from my parents’ family business, which was a water ski show of all things.
Stewart: And wait a minute, wait a minute. The one in Delton Lake?
Jeffrey: Yeah, Lake Delton, that’s right. That’s the lake that flooded, actually drained at one point was on the news nationally. So that’s the lake.
Stewart: That’s the lake. My daughter and I have been to the Wisconsin Dells, I’ve been to the Deer Park, I’ve been to Wilderness, I’ve been to Kalahari, I’ve done it all. I used to take a handful of Advil and just beat myself to death for two solid days up there when it was 94 degrees below zero outside and a balmy 75 inside. That is really good. That’s good stuff. So I’m sorry to interrupt. Go ahead.
Jeffrey: Yeah, no, so I grew up there and sort of cut my teeth learning how to work hard for a set of parents that expected to do all the bad jobs, like picking up trash and all the good stuff. But anyway, I ended up getting a finance degree in college and then ended up working for a little boutique consulting firm that was helping venture-backed startups with their strategic issues. And I ended up doing that for a few years, and then I ended up joining Adams Street, and I joined one of the investment teams at Adams Street that actually invests in venture-growing companies, taking board seats, getting actually involved, and trying to help those businesses grow and become important, hopefully go public or exit at some point. And really for the first 15 years, that was my job at Adams Street. And then when our founding CEO was riding off into retirement about 10 years ago, I was asked to take on the leadership of the firm.
So I effectively sit in the CEO and CIO seat today over our firm. The firm’s been around since 1972, back before the words leveraged buyout were even invented. And back then, we were just focused on venture capital and growth equity, where you made all your returns from top line growth. And then as the buyout asset class emerged, we became allocators in that asset class too, both to funds and then also getting access to the underlying companies directly as an equity investor. And then about 10 years ago, we launched our direct lending business to take advantage of those same relationships with buyout firms to become a direct lender to them. So today we’re about 62 billion under management. Most of that’s institutional. We also have some wealth pools, and we’ve got 330 people roughly around the globe and 13 offices today. And I generally am working out of our Chicago office, but I’m sort of traveling all over the place as well.
Stewart: So I was thinking the other day that I’ve gotten into a rut with these questions that I asked. People are now preparing for these things, and I’m always like, oh, now what do I do? So last night I had this crazy thought, here’s our new question. Maybe this is just too silly, but I’ll do it anyway. If you could only eat one food for the rest of your life, what would it be?
Jeffrey: Boy, that’s a great question. I would have to say steak. I am a glutton for just a terrific ribeye. This cooked medium rare. There you go. I could do that in Chicago, I can do that in Texas. I can do it in New York. So pretty much anywhere I go, I like it. That’d be my meal.
Stewart: I like it. I like it. Alright, here we go. So maybe we’ll stick with that one. I like that one. So in August of 2025, we’re recording toward the end of September. It takes a moment to get these through compliance, so there’s usually a little bit of a delay. But in August of 2025, you published a paper that was titled Private Credit Hyperscalers Risk Eroding Investor Returns. And it has garnered quite a bit of media interest from Bloomberg, the FT, and other leading financial news outlets. The question is, while the fuss, so as widely appreciated over the past decade or so, business development companies and life insurance general accounts of large publicly traded private credit managers have all seen massive AUM growth. Your observation is that this scaling puts significant pressure on investment teams to deploy capital, which can erode underwriting results, credit selection, and potentially lead to subpar returns. So historically, a governor for scaling has been institutional investors acting as a break on private credit managers’ ambitions. You contend that this isn’t happening with BDCs and life insurance units of publicly traded managers. So that’s a big mouthful to just say why is that? And Wall Street has a very well-documented history of growing something good until it breaks. And so talk to us about this. I don’t want to put words in your mouth here, but just talk to us about why this is.
Jeffrey: Yeah, great question. When primary clients, historically of private managers, whether those are private equity managers or private credit managers, have all been very sophisticated institutional investors who are sort of counterparties, and they effectively have regulate the scaling ambitions of those managers because they test whether or not someone’s getting too eager to raise a significantly larger fund. Historically, when that happens, it becomes very difficult to replicate good returns of the past because it sort of stretches you either into larger company sizes or maybe more competitive markets, that makes it difficult to alpha. And so that’s historically the way these asset classes have worked, but that has really shifted with the advent of BDCs and life insurance books that are sort of being directed into private credit managers. And so that power that used to sit with those institutional pools is diminished. And that has sort of created this phenomenon of what I’ll call hyperscalers that do our belief is that they potentially risk some forced deployment, which anytime you have forced deployment in an investment team, it generally won’t like the results.
Stewart: Can you just for our audience, explain what a BDC is?
Jeffrey: Yeah. BDC is a business development company. It’s a registered SEC vehicle that is designed to make direct loans to companies. Those loans could be sponsor-backed loans in the private credit sphere. It could be non-sponsored loans to private companies, and it could also be broadly syndicated loans or loans that generally are more tradable. Typically, with larger issuers that are issuing a hundred million plus an EBITDA, fairly sizable chunky pools of capital. And so those BDCs are available for retail investors to subscribe to and effectively step into a cash yield that’s being generated by that BDC and generate returns in a much more accessible way than say, a traditional drawdown from structure that would be raised every few years typically from institutions.
Stewart: And it’s because my brain is wired only for insurance asset management, but I would’ve thought that a lot of this is being driven by the insurance industry. It’s interesting that you talk about this regarding money coming from private wealth channels. So can you talk about the key drivers of hyper scaling?
Jeffrey: Yeah, and private credit managers have multiple pools of capital from which to draw from when they’re doing new investments. That could range from a commingled drawdown fund, that’s been very typical over the history of the industry, to separately managed accounts, maybe with rated feeders for insurance companies for either of those structures that make them ratings efficient. And then another very large potential pool is the wealth investor, and the typical format for that is these BDC products. And so really for a private credit manager, if you’re looking at what their total deployment is, you sort of need to glance across all those pools. Now, each of the investors into their own pool will know how big their pool is, but they may not have much visibility into the total aggregate pool of capital that a private credit manager has access to. So that’s a credit manager thinks about when they’re doing deals, how much capital do I have to deploy, and what size of companies am I going after? What’s my strategy? And look across all those pools and allocate deals appropriately across those.
Stewart: So give us an idea of the scale. How big are these BDCs? How much capital are they trying to deploy? We also know that there’s large insurance operations that are trying to deploy capital at the same time. Give some numbers at this please.
Jeffrey: Yeah, and there’s two real types of BDCs. They’re sort of publicly listed in traded BDCs, which typically are static in size. If they’re pricing of their shares is above NAV, they can choose to raise additional capital, but generally they tend to be pretty static. And then there’s the universe of private perpetual BDCs, which are not listed, are always open for new investors, and therefore flows can continue to come in and those BDCs can grow. If you look at as of end of Q1, those vehicles have amassed something in the order of about 128 billion of net assets, with the largest six products from publicly listed firms in the Altspace represented about 72% of that total. So it’s become a pretty chunky pool of capital and it’s been growing fairly rapidly due to the attractiveness for retail investors to step into an immediate yield and generate returns that are probably higher than what you could get by buying listed liquid bonds or possibly even high yield bonds. Private credit does offer a premium return to those, and so they become very attractive to investors in the wealth space.
Stewart: And what about life insurers? How do they compare from a deployment perspective?
Jeffrey: Yeah, so life insurers are a little bit more opaque. Historically, life insurers were independent entities. They have investment teams. Many of those may be in your audience. They’re looking to deploy capital with third-party managers that then invest in the underlying loans or fixed income securities of some sort. And obviously, they’re looking for some capital charge efficiency because that’s return per unit of rating over duration is always something that’s on insurance allocators’ mines. And so what’s been happening over the last decade then there’s been some very high profile insurance firms that have been bought by alternative asset managers is when you buy an insurance company, particularly in the life insurance space with annuity production, you tend to then terminate the relationships with those third party managers and redirect that pool of capital to your own manufacturing and production. And so it’s difficult to know exactly how much of the insurance industry is still independent and looking for third-party asset managers and maybe some of own in-house production and manufacturing versus the ones that are captive. But the top handful of publicly listed alts firms have all bought or strategically partnered with life insurance pools that are pretty substantial and represent a meaningful chunk of their overall deployment today. And our estimate is the largest for life insurances firms owned by or partnered with those publicly listed managers average about 190 billion of general account assets. So that’s pretty material if you look at the overall life insurance industry and where those would rank in the league tables.
Stewart: Yeah, absolutely. So talk to us about why or should investors be concerned about potential deterioration in underwriting and credit selection standards at the hyperscalers, but that also has implications for the rest of the market. I think everybody, the name of the game here is the underwriting of these loans, right? Are you starting to see cracks in the foundation anywhere or just talk to us about how insurance investors in particular should be thinking about this?
Jeffrey: Yeah, so I think it’s really important for investors regardless of which segment you fall into, but insurance companies should be mindful of this is what’s been happening to the overall annual deployment pace of the private credit managers that they’re doing business with. So I’ll use the example on the BDC side, and then I’ll pivot to the insurance book side. So our estimate is that the top four largest perpetual BDCs must, on average, invest 23 billion annually to keep those funds fully invested, which includes the target leverage. In a BDC, usually that’s one to one or maybe a little greater than one-to-one and the inflows that they’re seeing from new wealth investors because these are perpetually offered vehicles, and if you just looked at the largest one, we estimate that they would need to deploy 43 billion a year, which if you look at that as a percentage of the overall US direct lending market, that’s probably about 27% of what I would call the private credit US direct lending market.
So that gives you the order of magnitude about the potential need to deploy on that side. And then if we flip our lens over to the insurance side, if we look at those large four I mentioned with about 190 billion of general account assets on average, they would need to on average deploy about 47 billion a year annually just to recycle realized proceeds if you assume sort of a four year duration on any private credit loan investment. And so when you add those things up, that starts to be pretty material deployment. It would dwarf any institutional fund that anyone’s raised by an order of magnitude. And so again, back to this challenge is talk a little bit about maybe some of the signs that we see that would give us some concern as it pertains to this deployment scaling. It really starts to make you turn from an investor if you’re on the investment team into a deployer of capital.
And Warren Buffett likes to make this comment, he sits with 350 billion in cash today. I think at last year’s annual meeting. He’s like, I’d love to only have 50, but if you made me put that 300 billion to work in a three-year timeframe, I don’t think you’d like the results of that. And so it does get back to making sure that you don’t have deployment pressure on teams. And so where are the signs that we see the deployment pressure? We’ve definitely observed an erosion of pricing in terms in large direct lending deals. If you think about having to put those magnitudes of capital to work, where’s the easiest place to do that? It’s in very large deals because it’s a lot easier to do one large deal than it’s to do three or four small deals. Origination in that end of the market’s a little easier than origination is when you’re going down to the small midsize buyout end to the world.
And so we’ve definitely seen an erosion in pricing in terms at that end of the market. It makes sense because when you’re doing a large loan, you have to compete against the broadly syndicated loan market, which is mostly CLOs and leveraged loan funds that are investing in those securities. So if you’re an issuer, private equity-backed sponsor and you have a choice of doing something at a lower spread with looser terms and covenants with the broadly syndicated loan market, why would you then choose something that’s more expensive and has more covenants with a private credit lender? The answer is you can’t have to trade those off against each other. The one advantage of the private credit market is they can do delayed draw term loans if there’s a problem with the company, it’s easier to negotiate something that might be an equity infusion or a liability management exercise than it would be to do in the BSL market.
I think one of your prior interviewees touched on some of the complexities there. And so we’re seeing a tighter spreads in the large end of the market. We’re seeing higher loan-to-value ratios and oftentimes one turn higher in debt to EBITDA off generally more aggressively adjusted EBITDA. And the reason for that is that many of the people who invest in the broadly syndicated loans traditionally probably are not putting as much scrutiny on the loan documents because they’re getting their ratings and they get some comfort out of that, and therefore the loan documents tend to be a little looser and allow for collateral leakage and some other things. So that’s where we’re seeing probably a lot of the activity and stress and you don’t see it as much down into the lower and middle market size. So that’s one big one. Another one is you can see payment in kind flip.
So those are issuers that were paying cash interest that have now chosen to flip that to a PIK interest. And usually that’s because they don’t have enough cashflow to be able to service their debt. That became more pressured as the base rates increased and the obligations of those issuers increased and they put together the debt stacks in a day and age when base rates were much lower. So flips are another big one. And of course the other big concerning ones is just the underlying company quality businesses that may maybe more cyclical, maybe have more risk of AI disruption. And of course anytime that a borrower can carve out collateral from their loans or prime a senior lender, those are all very dangerous terms that you wouldn’t see accepted down in the middle market where there’s just a lot less competition from other investors that might do BSLs.
Stewart: So it makes sense to me that if hyperscalers are making accommodations. And you mentioned the term PIK, and I was hoping that you could maybe define what that is. I know that the NAIC is focusing on bonds that are in PIK non-accrual loan markdowns. What sort of canary in the coal mine warnings should we be looking for?
Jeffrey: Yeah, and it’s fascinating. If you look historically at default rates, since the GFC, default rates have been very low, one would expect the signs of stress of higher base rates and the stress that you will see with borrowers being able to service their debt showing up in higher defaults. And that really hasn’t been the case. I think more recently over the last several quarters, we’ve started to see credit agencies reporting on a rise in defaults, but there have been at least one credit agency and some other ones are referring to things called selective defaults. And that describes not just the actual defaults, but other ones that they view as effective defaults, which are these cash to PIK flips. And so let me just expand on that PIK term for a second. So PIK is payment in kind. And so a cash loan, basically the borrower is effectively paying cash interest.
It may have an amortization schedule of some sort. When you move to payment in kind, a portion of that cash actually turns into additional debt because it’s payment in kind. And so you’re basically adding to the debt stack. Usually, that rate on that PIK is higher than the cash rate, and so it’s adding debt at even a more compounded rate than if you were able to get the cash interest, but you have to pay a higher rate. And then it puts more debt on the books. And so for an already stressed borrower that’s having difficulty servicing its cash interest, now you’re adding debt to the equation through this PIK flip. And some of those are allowed by contract. Some of those are negotiated if the company runs into some challenges. So I think what we would’ve expected to see is sort of a rise in default rates representative with the base rates being higher five years from the original entry on these companies.
It’s really the first time in the history of the bio industry where that’s been the case rates have been on a long slow decline, and they’ve risen now. And so that would normally create stress. We just haven’t seen it show up materially in the default. I do think that’s starting to come. Obviously, liability management exercises are also another form factor for avoiding the default. And so these rating agencies are starting to focus on this selective default, which adds in all those things to the actual default rate equation. I think they’re seeing a lot of the same things that we are
Stewart: Super helpful. So it seems to me that there are ways that the hyperscalers could alleviate the deployment pressure. They could close the BDC to new investors. Talk to us about what could be done to alleviate this, and are there answers or better ways to deploy that capital?
Jeffrey: Yeah, as the CIO of Adams Street, I pay a lot of attention to how much access to high-quality capacity do each of our investment teams have. While, of course, we want to access as much of that as we can. The last thing I want to do is add more capital than what they’ve got access to because I know exactly what will happen. Their incentives will be to deploy that capital, and it will ultimately probably result in compromise underwriting standards, whether you’re on the private equity side or the private credit side. So that’s super important. It’s easier for us to do because a privately owned firm, we’re a partnership. We don’t have outside shareholders that are telling the management team that you really need to grow your fee earning assets. And when you become a public company, there is a lot of pressure on fee earning asset growth, and you can see analyst reports that cover publicly listed companies in and around the category.
They focus on a lot of their attention on fee earning asset growth. And so if you have a BDC, that’s a perpetually offered BDC, you’re out serving wealth investors probably through bank platforms or RIAs or other channels. If you were to shut that BDC to new flows, that would probably not be something your shareholders would be very excited about. Also, your channel partners would probably have that demand from the wealth investor go to some of your competitors products. So the incentive systems really aren’t perfectly aligned with someone saying, you know what? I don’t want to put deployment pressure on my teams, and I really want to stop flows. But that would clearly be one way to do that. BDCs do have restrictions on the types of assets you can put in them. You can’t do things that are not direct loans, so it limits your ability to open up the deal funnels to other lending products like asset-based finance or other areas.
And so that would be clearly a solution. Absent that, I think what you’ll see is continued growth in these BDCs continued deployment pressure, and probably continued moves towards larger deals and taking market share from the broadly syndicated loan market. The easiest way to deploy at scale, as I mentioned, it’s much harder to do that, and you have to have a lot more resources to be in the lower and middle market side of the business, just the volumes are harder and you have to deal with origination and a bunch of other challenges there. So, in addition, the big unknown here is that these BDCs do have redemption features. If investors would like to sell, they can do so. There’s generally a cap of 5% per quarter, and there’s a board that can obviously decide to gate that if they need to protect all investors, if a bunch of people are rushing for the exits. But we’ve probably not seen yet a real stress scenario where the world’s running into major liquidity, alt problems, all at once, like we saw in the GFC, and ultimately we’ll see what will happen to some of those vehicles. So there are some just looming things that I think investors should be mindful of.
Stewart: If nothing else, we’re a pro industry podcast, we pro insurance industry, and I asked some of these questions from the standpoint of my friends that are CIOs, right? Is it possible for a manager to camouflage problem loans? And if so, how would they do it? What should an investor be looking for?
Jeffrey: Yeah, and look, I mean, there are a lot of very smart actors in the private credit ecosystem in general, and I do think a lot of highly ethical actors too, just trying to do the right thing. Obviously, with pressure that can put intensity around what people are doing. But we did write an article about: is there camouflaging happening with loans that are masking some problem loans? And I think we sort of look at five potential red flags. If you’re actually looking at an underlying loan book, whether it’s in a BDC, whether it’s in insurance book, whether it’s in a private credit fund, it doesn’t really matter. And I mentioned one already, which are these PIK conversions loans that were issued for cash, and all of a sudden flipped to PIK. That should be on people’s radar screens because that will probably increase the loan-to-value pressure that’s on our already stressed borrower.
In addition, loan to value is a key metric I think people should look at when they can. And there are some exceptional businesses that can handle high loan to value if they’re high recurring high margin, maybe tolerate something that’s over 60%. But once you get to that 60% loan to value threshold, you should probably be doing a little bit of homework on the underlying loans that are triggering that. In addition, there’s interest rate coverage. Companies with cash interest that exceeds their EBITDA should be a major flag. So if interest coverage is less than one, I think I’ve seen a couple credit rating agency reports that say there’s at least 17% or more of loans that right now have less than one to one interest coverage. So that should be another concern and a flag as people due diligence. And then deteriorating fundamentals is the other one.
Are the portfolio companies still healthy? Are they growing their revenue, growing their EBITDA? If those are in decline, that’s going to create some LTV pressure. It’s going to create some interest coverage pressure. I take analysis from Kroll indicated about 21% of levered loans actually have declining in EBITDA. Another 16% have declining revenue. So the underlying quality of the borrowers is hugely important. And then finally, when companies are at risk of maybe defaulting lenders will agree to material loan amendments and LMEs, when those things are happening, it probably makes sense to pay attention to what’s actually occurring there. One of the big challenges for investors is how do you get the transparency into the loan book? Institutional investors ask for a loan book tape and they give all those statistics, we provide that to our institutional investors. But when you move over to BDCs or pools that are maybe have less transparency, it’s a lot harder to do that. So some of these statistics are unfortunately not available to many investors, but most sophisticated institutions and insurance allocators should be able to ask for loan book tapes to really, really dig in. And ultimately, that’ll tell you the story about whether lenders have real edge in originating underwriting and winning good deals, and also give you a sense for what’s been happening with the total deployment across all your pools. And then am I worried about deployment, scaling pressure as well? So those will be telltale signs for institutional investors including insurance allocators.
Stewart: Super helpful. I mean, it’s been a great education. I did not understand this issue when you started. If you could give our audience a couple of takeaways, and then I got a couple of fun ones for you on the way at the door, but what are one or two takeaways that you’d say from a big picture perspective? Yeah,
Jeffrey: I’d say the historical dispersion of returns in direct lending or private credit for between managers in the top median and bottom quartile has been very narrow for a long time. And most of that dispersion happens because of defaults and loan losses. And I would say that probably will increase and see the manager dispersion widen. So it’s super important for people to pick their managers well and do the diligence that I mentioned on the loan book tape before they make decisions about who they’re going to trust with their capital. And secondly, look at the overall deployment that a manager has been doing over the last several years across all of their pools. If you do those two things, you’re going to be able to select well, and you’ll be happy with the returns if you don’t select well or aren’t able to do that homework. I think people should be prepared for possibly being disappointed with certain manager returns, maybe making you wonder why you allocated the private credit relative to say some other credit alternatives.
Stewart: Alright. So a little bit on the culture at Adams Street Partners. What characteristics are you looking for when you’re adding to members of the team there? And by the way, as a former Chicago guy, your firm has a really outstanding reputation, but talk to us about what you’re looking for characteristics wise when you’re hiring.
Jeffrey: Yeah, we are an employee-owned firm, highly diversified ownership. I’m the largest shareholder between 6 and 7%. And so we really want people with an ownership mentality. And because we’re employee-owned and we actually have a lot of our own personal capital invested, so we’re sort of our own wealth management client, we are highly aligned with our end investors, whether those are institutional or wealth investors or anything in between. And so for us, we really want people that come in with an investor-first lens, they have a high degree of integrity and operate in a collaborative and partnership-oriented manner. Those are critical for us regardless of where across our global 13 offices we’re hiring people.
Stewart: That’s terrific. Alright, last one. What’s coming? Who you most like to have lunch with a live or dead? You can have up to three guests, doesn’t have to be three. It can be one, two, or three. Jeff Diehl, who you having for dinner?
Jeffrey: Yeah, so top of my list would be Alexander Hamilton. I’m always fascinated with this country’s history, both from the constitution side, but also from the initial formation of the financial markets. And he was right at the ecosystem in the center of that, that’s for sure, number one. Number two probably is Albert Einstein. He helped this country in a very interesting and dangerous time, so having a bit of a chat with him and picking his brain about everything he knows I probably wouldn’t understand half of it, but I’d be fascinated to spend some time with him. And the other one is probably Ben Franklin, Charlie Munger, and Warren. I’m big fans of those guys. And Ben Franklin was a huge idol of Charlie Munger, and I’m fascinated by his history as well. So unfortunately they’re all deceased, but those would be great folks to have lunch with.
Stewart: It’s really interesting. We had a Ben Franklin impersonator at our event in Philadelphia, and this person would not break character, period, the end. And I didn’t know, he said, did you know that this building, the one that we were in, the Thompson Hotel, was the first building in Philadelphia that was designed to accept electrical wiring in advance?
Jeffrey: Oh, that’s great.
Stewart: And I was like, whoa. So Ben Franklin, and I may get this wrong, don’t yell at me audience if I get this wrong, but the Philadelphia Contribution ship is one of the first insurance companies, and Ben Franklin was one of the founders. That’s incredible. I mean, the things that this person did was incredible. I was a finance guy. I didn’t do a lot of history. The other one we had was we had a Thomas Jefferson impersonator, and he was terrific too. I mean, they did a marvelous job. It was really entertaining.
Jeffrey: That’s
Stewart: Great. I really appreciate you being on, great conversation. The title of this podcast was Private Credit Hyperscalers: A Ticking Time Bomb. Our guest has been Jeffrey Diehl, Managing Partner and Head of Investments at Adams Street Partners. Jeff, thanks for taking the time.
Jeffrey: Thanks, Stewart. Really appreciate it.
Stewart: If you like what we’re doing, please rate us, review us on Apple Podcast, Spotify, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows. If you want to see what we’re up to, you can check us out on our new YouTube channel at InsuranceAUMCommunity. My name’s Stewart Foley. We’re the home of the world’s smartest money at insuranceaum.com.
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