
Liquidity levels in private equity buyouts have declined significantly since 2021, and in 2023 reached less than half the 25-year average in Adams Street’s US and European portfolios (Figure 1). While buyout portfolios have shown resilience to macroeconomic volatility, they also face liquidity challenges, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Buyout Distributions Received as % of Beginning NAV1
The chart shows that, since 2000, buyout distributions for Adams Street’s US and European portfolio have respectively averaged 23% and 24% of opening net asset value (NAV). However, after reaching a post-global financial crisis peak in 2021, distributions fell significantly below the long-term average, although the five-year average is still a respectable 20%. While one could argue that some exits were brought forward and executed in 2021, other factors are also at play.
Geopolitical tensions, inflationary pressures, and shifting interest rate expectations are among the reasons for the uptick in volatility in the broad economy. Increased uncertainty and a higher-for-longer interest rate environment mean buyers are unable or unwilling to pay prices seen in 2020-21. However, high-quality assets continue to transact, and the two main exit routes – trade sales and financial sponsor – remain available, providing a steady, if somewhat constrained, source of liquidity, as Figure 2 shows for Adams Street exit volume in Europe.
A key development in recent years is the increasing use of continuation vehicles (CV) as an exit route. This trend has been supported by the significant capital raised by secondary funds, which has provided buyout managers with another way to generate liquidity. According to Jefferies, global secondary market transaction volume rose to a record $162 billion in 2024, a 45% increase from 2023.2 However, CVs have yet to reach a scale that significantly shifts overall market dynamics. Jefferies reports that CVs accounted for 84% of the $75 billion in GP-led secondary transactions in 2024.3 In the Adams Street primary portfolio, CVs account for a relatively small portion of buyout exits, with only about 2% of European exits since 2013 to CVs by number of transactions. Despite the very large market share enjoyed by CVs in secondary transactions in recent years, we nevertheless expect the market’s use of CVs to continue growing.
Since 2000, average US and European buyout distributions for Adams Street portfolio companies have been relatively consistent across small/mid and large/mega buyout deals, with both sectors running at about 23%, as shown in Figure 3. However, in the slower exit environment since 2022, the data show that small- and mid-sized managers have returned a greater percentage of their NAV than their larger peers. The trend in the two years post-GFC was similar, as Figure 3 shows. One factor that could explain this in part is a lesser dependence on favourable capital markets to drive exits. Smaller companies tend to use less leverage and typically don’t rely on the IPO exit route, but rather sell up the value chain to another financial sponsor or to a trade buyer.
A defining characteristic of liquidity patterns over the past three years has been the strong performance of highquality assets. Even as overall exit volume declined, companies that were sold achieved premium valuations, leading to higher-than-average return multiples. As shown in Figure 4, the majority of exits have been concentrated in technology and tech-enabled businesses, as well as services sectors that continue to perform well despite macroeconomic volatility. Many of these companies share several characteristics that boost their attractiveness to buyers, resulting in higher-than-average exit multiples: they are asset-light businesses that require relatively low capital expenditure, and have high margins and recurring revenue streams that provide more stable and predictable cash flows.
As mentioned earlier, trade sales and secondary buyouts to financial sponsors are the dominant liquidity routes, collectively accounting for over 75% of our buyout portfolio’s exits since 2013 by number of transactions.
While the first quarter of 2025 showed some positive signs, with distributions in our US and European buyout portfolio marginally higher versus the same period in the prior year, the picture looks less certain for the remainder of 2025. A murky macro picture, due in part to uncertainty over tariffs, makes it more difficult to see a clear liquidity picture for the remainder of the year. The financial resilience of buyout portfolios and multiple exit routes make us cautiously optimistic about the ability to generate liquidity despite the macro environment, but strong exits will likely remain available only to high-quality assets, particularly in sectors that exhibit strong fundamentals and structural tailwinds.
1. Source: ASP Data
2. Jefferies, Global Secondary Market Review, Page 2, January 2025
3. Jefferies, Global Secondary Market Review, Page 9, January 2025
4. Source: ASP data. Small/mid buyout defined as $5 billion or less, large/mega buyout more than $5 billion.
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